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REGULATING THE POWER SHIFT:  
THE STATE, CAPITAL AND ELECTRICITY 
PRIVATISATION IN AUSTRALIA 
Damien Cahill and Sharon Beder 
In 1990, British political economist Grahame Thompson observed: 
One of the most remarkable features of the ‘conservative turn’ 
experienced in the UK since 1980 is the paradoxical emergence 
of extensive reregulation of economic activity in a period 
supposedly typified by drastic deregulation. (Thompson, 1990: 
135) 
Thompson’s comments point to one of the central, but least understood, 
contradictions of neo-liberalism: that a system which is justified on the 
premise of a withdrawal of state intervention in the economy has entailed 
an active role for the state in its implementation and maintenance. This 
article examines the realities of neo-liberalism in practice through an 
analysis of the history and experience of electricity privatisation in 
Australia. Such realities are contrasted with common assumptions made 
about neo-liberalism by both its advocates and some of its opponents. 
The case of electricity privatisation, it is argued, highlights not only the 
failure of neo-liberalism to deliver its promised benefits, but also the 
centrality of the capitalist state and class conflict to the dynamics of neo-
liberalism in practice. We therefore reject the ‘withering away of the 
state’ approach to understanding neo-liberalism. In doing this we are 
contributing to a critique of the role of capital and the state in neo-
liberalism. 
6     JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIAN POLITICAL ECONOMY  No 55 
 
Neo-liberalism, Capital and the State 
According to neo-liberal theory, ‘markets’, when freed from state 
interference, are the most efficient, and most moral, way of providing 
goods and services in society. Although most neo-liberals admit a limited 
role for the state in enforcing the rule of law and, sometimes, in 
providing a ‘safety net’, they nonetheless argue for a severe reduction in 
the state provision of services such as education and health care, and a 
dismantling of regulations limiting corporate powers. Through 
privatisation, deregulation and marketisation, argue neo-liberals, a more 
prosperous and more free, although not necessarily a more equal, society 
will eventuate. For neo-liberals it is not only the scope of government 
activity that must be reduced, but the size of government as well. Neo-
liberals therefore call for significant cuts to state spending. 
Over the last twenty years, the neo-liberal philosophy has come to 
dominate policy making in Australia and stands as the dominant 
ideological frame through which society is understood within the media, 
the bureaucracy and political elites. Australian scholars have produced 
many valuable critiques of both the theory and practice of neo-liberalism 
– or ‘economic rationalism’ with which it is synonymous (Argy, 1998; 
Bell, 1997; Carroll & Manne, 1992; Fairbrother, Svensen & Teicher, 
1997a; Pusey, 1991; Quiggin, 1996; Rees, Ridley & Stilwell, 1993; 
Sawer, 1982; Self, 1993; Stretton & Orchard, 1994). These have tended 
to detail the inability of neo-liberal markets to deliver socially just 
outcomes and the ideological dogmatism inherent in neo-liberal theory. 
Implicit in the language, if not the actual analysis of a number of these 
critiques, however, is the notion that neo-liberalism entails a ‘withering 
away of the state’ (Fairbrother, Teciher & Svensen, 1997b), a ‘retreat of 
the state’ (Quiggin, 1996: 26) or ‘small government’ (Argy, 1998: 80-
87).  Such assumptions are mirrored by critiques of neo-liberalism 
internationally, with Susan Strange’s (1996) The Retreat of the State 
being perhaps the best known example.  
Yet, there is a growing body of literature which recognises the central 
role played by the state and capital in constructing, regulating and 
maintaining a neo-liberal economy in Australia and elsewhere in the 
world. There are two main aspects to this critique. The first is the 
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recognition that neo-liberalism did not simply arise organically out of the 
crisis of the Keynesian welfare state1 from the 1970s onwards (see for 
example Arrighi, 2002). Rather, the economic crisis of the 1970s 
provided the context for a mobilisation by particular fractions of capital 
in an attempt to shape state policy making in their own interests. In 
Australia, for example, Bell (1997: 81, 116-7) has written of a ‘neo-
liberal coalition’ and Kaptein (1993: 103) of a ‘neo-liberal power bloc’ 
which brought together leading fractions of Australian capital and which 
actively pursued the dismantling of the key institutions and social truths 
underpinning the Australian Settlement – tariff protections and 
arbitration – as well as those underpinning Australia’s post-war 
Keynesian welfare state. This was not merely a mobilisation aimed at 
increasing capital’s profitability, it was also an attempt to diminish the 
power of organised labour which had been bolstered in the post-war 
years by full employment and, in the late 1960s and into the 1970s, by 
militant unionism. This is captured by Berger who argues, ‘a defining 
characteristic of the rise of neo-liberalism has been an historic victory of 
capital over labour’ (Berger, 1999: 453).  
The second aspect of this critique is a recognition of the role of the 
capitalist state in the construction and maintenance of neo-liberalism. 
Partly this stems from an appreciation of centrality of the state to the 
reproduction of capitalist economic relations in general. As Bell states, 
‘the neoliberal concept of a ‘free market’ is a contradiction in terms: 
markets are always and everywhere artefacts of state power and 
regulatory capacity’ (Bell, 1997: 258). Neo-liberals, and some of their 
critics, fail to understand this. As Jessop writes, ‘the capital relation 
cannot be  reproduced entirely through market exchange’ (Jessop, 2002: 
18). The state is crucial for providing the framework within which 
                                                           
1 The terms 'Keynesian welfare state' and 'Keynesian social democracies' are used 
here as shorthand for a range of policies, institutions and social relations which 
coincided during the post-war years in many western capitalist democracies. This 
is not to deny the particularities of national configurations. Australia, for example, 
had a far less comprehensive welfare state system than did Britain or Sweden, with 
the wages system serving as the primary vehicle for redistribution, and can thus be 
described as a 'residual' welfare system (see Castles, 1985). Nor is this to suggest a 
direct correlation between the economic prescriptions advocated by Keynes, and 
the macro-economic policies which bore his name (for a discussion of this issue in 
the Australian context see Battin, 1997). 
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capitalist relations can exist through such activities as the provision of 
infrastructure, the regulation of markets, the maintenance of ‘social 
cohesion’ (Jessop, 2002: 21) or the correction of ‘market failure’ (Jessop, 
2002: 41). Even a pluralist such as Charles Lindblom argues that the state 
must ‘induce’ business to perform its role in capitalist society (Lindblom, 
1977: 173-4). Radical neo-liberal ideology is blind to this because it is an 
idealist form of bourgeois individualism – what Evan Jones calls ‘idealist 
economics’ (Jones, 2000). It misunderstands and mystifies capitalist 
social relations at the same time as deifying them.  
The recognition that the state is central to neo-liberalism stems also from 
observation of neo-liberalism in practice. It was primarily through the 
capitalist state that the institutions and ideologies underpinning 
Keynesian social democracies were dismantled, and it has been through 
the capitalist state that neo-liberalism has been maintained and extended. 
Albo captures the essence of this when he writes: 
it is entirely misleading to see neoliberalism as an attack on the 
state in favor of the market, or as a hollowing out of the state to 
the global and local, or a bypassing of the state by corporate 
power. Neoliberalism has operated through the institutions of the 
nation-state (Albo, 2002: 51). 
A number of Australian scholars have recognised this point. Tim 
Anderson, for example, argues that contrary to neo-liberal rhetoric, neo-
liberalism in practice has meant: 
a market re-regulation to guarantee new and profitable markets to 
large corporations, and a social re-regulation to restrict the 
meaning of citizenship, where this conflicts with the delivery of 
profitable markets to large corporations (Anderson, 1999: 18). 
Frank Stilwell argues that: 
In practice, the policies [of neo-liberalism] have been less about 
‘slimming the state’ than about aiming the state more directly to 
serve the interests of capital, and the financial sector in particular. 
(Stilwell, 2000: 52). 
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Similarly, Dick Bryan states that neo-liberalism has entailed ‘an explicit 
agenda to enforce the power of capital’ (Bryan, 2000: 345). Following 
from these critiques we understand neo-liberalism as a new ‘mode of 
regulation’ (Jessop, 2002) that seeks to overturn and dismantle the 
hegemonies and institutions that constituted the post-war class 
compromise, and to further socialise the costs of capitalist profitability. 
In doing this neo-liberalism entails a deepening of the processes of 
commodification, a transfer of power from labour to capital, and a 
transfer of resources from public to private. Using electricity 
privatisation as a case study, the remainder of this article builds upon 
such critiques to present a fuller picture of actually existing neo-
liberalism than is offered by neo-liberalism’s advocates or by adherents 
to the ‘withering away of the state’ thesis. 
Making the case for Electricity Privatisation in Australia 
Electricity privatisation in Australia did not arise out of popular struggles 
or discontent. Rather, leading fractions of capital played a key role in 
advocating and supporting privatisation, particularly the financial 
markets, the media and energy intensive industries (Kelly, 1992: 224). 
The Business Council of Australia (BCA) ‘played a prominent role’ in 
electricity reform in Australia. It formed an Electricity Task Force to 
‘provide a leadership role to support and achieve reforms in the 
electricity industry, thereby assisting Australian enterprises in becoming 
internationally competitive’ (Daniels, 1993: 67). The BCA persuaded the 
government to direct the Bureau of Industry Economics (BIE) to 
undertake a series of studies identifying the costs of infrastructure 
services such as electricity, comparing their performance with the best 
overseas, and publishing the comparisons regularly. The BCA committed 
‘considerable financial and personnel resources’ to this benchmarking 
exercise as well as associated studies (Daniels, 1993: 60, 63).  
Not surprisingly, the BCA-funded studies found some gaps between the 
performance of Australian services and the best around the world. Nor is 
it surprising that the BCA recommended that government services be 
exposed to more competition from the private sector ‘by removing the 
monopoly powers of government business enterprises and other barriers 
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to competition’ (Daniels, 1993: 66-7) and that some of these enterprises 
should be divested to the private sector where they could be performed 
more efficiently (Loton, 1993: 4).  
Business owners and executives also played a central role in setting up, 
funding and promoting think tanks and staffing their boards. These 
corporate funded think tanks proliferated in Australia in the 1980s and 
1990s and campaigned tirelessly to get privatisation and deregulation 
onto the political agenda. During the 1990s they published about 900 
reports and discussion papers each year and held some 600 conferences 
and symposia (G. Murray & Pacheco, 2001).  
Perhaps the most effective instance of this corporate sponsorship of neo-
liberal opinion was Project Victoria. It was established in 1990 when 13 
business organisations commissioned the Tasman Institute and the 
Institute for Public Affairs (IPA) to outline a comprehensive neo-liberal 
agenda for Victoria. These organisations included the Australian 
Chamber of Manufacturers, the BCA, the State Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry, the Victorian Employers Federation and the Victorian 
Farmers Federation. Project Victoria set the agenda for privatisation and 
provided detailed advice on its implementation in Victoria. It covered 
water, ports, electricity, public transport and workers compensation. The 
Kennett Government implemented most of Project Victoria’s 
recommendations after it was elected and in some cases went further, 
slashing the public service workforce by more than three times the 1991 
report recommendations (Kohler, 1997: 15). 
Business was also critical of community service obligations embedded in 
the State electricity supply arrangements, including uniform tariffs across 
the State to cross-subsidise remote customers and non-statutory 
environmental obligations.  According to Project Victoria, these 
obligations caused business users to be overcharged by 28% (not 
including farmers who were subsidised) and impeded ‘competitiveness 
by distorting service provision’ (Moore & Porter, 1991: 4-6). 
While such business-funded rhetoric painted a grim picture of the 
government-owned electricity industry in Australia, it ignored the real 
efficiency improvements that had been taking place under the existing 
system. The Industries Assistance Commission (IAC), for example, 
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recognised that, when it came to electricity supply, the state authorities 
were in fact improving their efficiency and productivity. The Electricity 
Commission of NSW had reduced staffing by 30 percent in two years 
and the State Electricity Commission of Victoria (SECV) had reduced 
staffing, cut operating costs, reduced reserve plant margins and cut 
average electricity prices by 3 percent a year since 1985 (cited in Access 
Economics, 2001: 14).  Project Victoria's preliminary report, Victoria: 
An Agenda for Change, while noting that the State Electricity 
Commission of Victoria (SECV) had been one of the least productive 
electricity providers in Australia, admitted that one of the reasons had 
been its reliance on low-grade brown coal, which requires a more capital 
intensive electricity generation process, and that performance had 
improved markedly during the late 1980s (Moore & Porter, 1991: 4-4, 4-
5). 
The real reason that business was advocating privatisation had less to do 
with efficiency than with undermining union power and shifting some of 
the costs of electricity supply onto the householder, thus further 
socialising the costs of capitalist profitability. Strikes were frequent in 
the industry and demarcation disputes and overstaffing had become a 
problem with up to 24 unions covering each power station. However, 
these problems were addressed prior to privatisation when unions were 
rationalised with the help of the Australian Council of Trade Unions 
(ACTU) and employee numbers were reduced from 20,000 to 8000 prior 
to privatisation (R. Murray, 1995: 46). In the words of Michael Porter, 
head of the neo-liberal Tasman Institute, privatisation would remove ‘the 
“ball and chain” and the labour market practices that stop business… 
from prospering’. Electricity privatisation was also seen as way of 
allowing private firms ‘to get a piece of the action’ (Porter, 2001) by 
opening up ready-made monopoly firms for private corporations to 
purchase at bargain prices. 
Despite the questionable assumptions upon which proponents of 
privatisation based their arguments, Commonwealth agencies and some 
state governments took up the privatisation baton from business. The 
IAC played a key role in influencing and supporting the ‘reform’ process 
through its many reports which were widely covered in the media 
(Corden, 1994: 112-3). Other supporting agencies included Treasury, the 
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Department of Finance, and the Bureasu of Agricultural Economics, 
Industry Economics and Labour Market Research (Duncan & McAdam, 
1985: 38). Although noting improvements in performance within the 
state-owned electricity industry, the IAC did not accept that full 
efficiency could be achieved without private ownership. It recommended 
that, in advance of privatisation, the public utilities should be 
corporatised and that generation, transmission and distribution sectors in 
each state should be separated. New investment should be subject to 
competitive tender in the private sector. The Commission also proposed 
the division of generation capacity into separate competing companies 
with open access to the transmission and distribution networks for new 
private generating facilities.  
These recommendations were endorsed at the 1991 Special Premier’s 
Conference. They were also strongly supported by the major 
international bureaucracies: the IMF, the World Bank and the OECD. 
They were subsequently adopted, first in Victoria and then in other 
states. A National Competition Council was set up to oversee the 
restructuring process. 
Such moves went against the tide of popular sentiment. Privatisation met 
with strong community opposition in most states. Public opinion was 
clearly against private ownership of electricity. A 1994 Saulwick Age 
national poll had found that over two thirds of those surveyed favoured 
public ownership; and an EPAC study the same year had also found that 
most Australians supported government provision of infrastructure 
(Miller, 1995: 6). The initial reluctance of States, other than Victoria, to 
privatise government services, because it was politically unpopular, was 
overcome by incentive payments of $16 billion from the federal 
government. It was only because of ‘intense pressure’ and financial 
incentives from the federal government and other states that South 
Australia agreed to restructure its electricity industry and then join the 
National Electricity Market (NEM) (Booth, 2000: 107-9). The Olsen 
government had been re-elected in 1997 after promising not to privatise 
its electricity. However, within weeks it reneged and announced the sale. 
The business community in South Australia was strongly in favour of 
privatisation of electricity but there was also solid community opposition 
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and the government lost office at the following election in 2002 (Spoehr, 
2000: 16).  
State governments found privatisation attractive, despite public opinion, 
because it promised a short term influx of money into government 
coffers. A primary political motivation for privatisation in the states of 
Victoria and South Australia was debt reduction. However, although 
state debt fell from $76 billion in 1993 to $47 billion in 1997, taxpayers 
were often not any better off, particularly with respect to electricity 
privatisations (Leeuwen, 1997: 9).  
In the early 1990s the Victorian state government had such a large 
government debt ($32 billion) that its credit rating was downgraded by 
international rating agencies. Privatisation was supposed to be a way of 
reducing the government debt and therefore taxes and charges to 
business. In fact the SECV’s debt was not really a problem. In the year 
before it was broken up, 1992/3, ‘it paid $995 million in interest, a $191 
million dividend to the State Government, and had a profit of $207 
million’ (Skulley, 1995: 32).  
In South Australia, where electricity privatisation was promoted as a debt 
reduction measure, the debt was portrayed as being out of control. 
However, the Electricity Trust of South Australia (ETSA) had 
contributed some $2 billion dollars to state revenue over the previous 
decade and its operating costs had decreased significantly (Kelton & 
Wheatley, 2001b: 23). Neo-liberal economist, Richard Blandy, later 
confirmed that: 
revenues earned by ETSA for the South Australian government 
before it was privatised would match, if not exceed, the interest 
on South Australian debt retired as a result of ETSA’s sale. 
Hence, South Australians now face historically high electricity 
prices compared with the rest of Australia for no net benefit to the 
state government finances (Blandy, 2002: 11).  
This supports John Quiggin's argument that: 
The privatisation of the South Australian electricity industry has 
reduced the net worth of the public sector … the interest savings 
on the sale price will fall consistently short of the earnings 
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foregone through privatisation. This is consistent with most 
Australian experience of privatisation (Quiggin, 2003: 68). 
In summary, electricity privatisation, like neo-liberalism in general, has 
been a class-based project through and through – driven by business 
interests and state elites and justified on the grounds of small 
government, efficiency and debt reduction. The goal of debt reduction 
has not been realised, as this capacity has been diminished through the 
jettisoning of state-owned revenue sources in the form of electricity 
utilities. For capital, the goal has been the transformation of publicly 
owned monopolies into private oligopolies, and the reduction of union 
power. 
Implementing Privatisation - Neoliberalism in Practice 
Because electricity is not a commodity that can be easily traded in shops 
or on the stock market, the establishment of a wholesale market in 
electricity that would foster competition required the creation of a whole 
new set of institutions and regulations to ensure supply and demand are 
balanced at all times, ancillary services are supplied and maintained, and 
incentives exist for investment in new infrastructure (Beder, 2003: 9-11). 
Such interventionist state activities fly in the face of neo-liberal rhetoric 
about 'small government', but by investigating such regulations it is 
possible to advance our understanding of 'actually existing neo-
liberalism'. 
In Victoria the government had to establish a power pool where 
wholesale electricity prices would be set according to complex rules. It 
mandated that all electricity had to be traded through this power pool. To 
help generators and retailers cope with the wildly fluctuating prices of 
the pool, a system of vesting contracts was introduced. Drawing on the 
UK model, a formula was devised to pay distribution companies based 
on the consumer price index. 
In the other states, governments restructured their electricity services by 
separating generation, transmission, distribution and retail supply and 
corporatising the ensuing organisations. Barriers to interstate trade were 
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removed and open access for electricity generators to use electricity 
networks established. The Commonwealth government set up a partial 
national electricity grid covering 7 million customers in Eastern and 
Southern Australia by 2001 (Beder, 2003).  
The National Electricity Market (NEM) began operations in 1998, with 
Victoria, NSW and SA taking part. Queensland later joined and 
Tasmania will join when the ‘Basslink’ to the mainland is completed. 
The government established a National Electricity Market Management 
Company (NEMMCO) to run the NEM — which in turn set up 
numerous working groups on things like dispatch, pricing, 
interconnection options, plant modelling, reliability, metering, and 
security — and a National Electricity Code Administrator (NECA) to 
regulate it. NEMMCO has a budget of around $60 million and employs 
over 200 staff. The ACCC also has regulatory responsibility over the 
industry, as the states have their own regulatory bodies responsible for 
the industry. 
During 2002 the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) conducted 
a review of NEM, which identified some deficiencies in the energy 
market, including excessive regulation, perceptions of conflict of interest, 
excessive generator market power and power pool volatility, fragmented 
transmission network planning, and ad hoc responses to greenhouse gas 
emissions. To remedy these deficiencies it recommended that a National 
Energy Regulator be created in place of the various state regulatory 
bodies (COAG, 2002). Thus, the new privatised electricity environment 
is underpinned by new and extensive (rather than by a lack of) state 
regulatory structures. 
Despite the promises of neoliberal advocates, prices went up after 
privatisation and deregulation. According to Booth (whose figures are 
based upon accounts published annually by the distribution companies 
themselves), the distribution companies made huge profits (30 or 40% of 
their total revenue) – much higher than have been earned by most listed 
companies in Australia (Booth, 2000: 64-8). This has been at the expense 
of consumers, and points to the class interests at work in the privatisation 
of electricity and, indeed, in the neo-liberal turn more generally. 
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NEM operated on the same principle as the Victorian power pool which 
had been modelled on the now defunct UK power pool. Following the 
UK experience, there had been plenty of warnings of the potential for 
price manipulation in the national market, and not surprisingly this 
occurred in Australia too. Generators were able to withhold capacity on 
hot days until the price peaked and they could then rebid their capacity at 
inflated prices. Generators admitted that the reason for rebidding was 
‘financial optimisation’. Until 2001 electricity prices to households did 
not suffer much ‘mainly through tight government controls’. These were 
progressively removed after that date as retail markets were opened to 
competition and the pain of skyrocketing rates began to be felt (Anon., 
2001: 54; James, 2001b: 19; Sexton, 2001; Wilson, 2001: 8). 
After the market had been operating for a few years, price manipulation 
was confirmed by a study done by the Australian Bureau of Agricultural 
and Resource Economics, a supporter of deregulation and competition in 
electricity markets (ABARE, 2002).  Whilst prices were initially 
manipulated by physical withholding capacity, generators moved to 
economic withholding in 2000: that is, bidding large chunks of their 
capacity at very high prices (ACCC, 2002: 77-8).  
After privatisation the NEM pool prices for SA increased and were much 
higher than for other participating states. By 2002 residential rates had 
increased by forty percent since 1994, and householders now pay more 
for their electricity than anywhere else in Australia, thirty percent more 
than in non-privatised NSW (compared with ten percent more pre-
privatisation and the opening of markets) (Beechey, 2001: 16; Morton, 
2000). Clearly then, the effect of electricity privatisation was to secure 
greater freedoms – the freedom to set prices and to withhold supply – for 
businesses who moved into the electricity market. Prices in the privatised 
electricity market have not been competitive, contrary to the predictions 
of neo-liberal advocates. 
In early 2001 only ten percent of major employers in South Australia had 
been able to secure new electricity contracts to cover them when their old 
ones expired. Those with new contracts faced heavy price increases 
(James, 2001a; Kelton & Wheatley, 2001a: 19; Wilson, 2001: 8). These 
large businesses, which originally pushed for privatisation and 
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deregulation, found that they were worse off. Spot prices were so high 
that:  
a new summer pastime has grown in SA called “curtailment”, a 
term used to describe a situation where a business might find the 
cost of electricity so high they can make more money by shutting 
down their operation and on-selling the power they would have 
used (Sexton, 2001). 
Fuses and transformers across SA failed, and transmission across high-
voltage lines was deliberately cut off to avoid potential fires on very hot 
days. There were 500 outages in January 2001 alone.  Unions claimed 
that the 900 workers employed to check and repair powerlines in 1991 
had been reduced to about 300, whilst maintenance crews were reduced 
from 270 to 90. According to SA auditor-general Ken McPherson, the 
leasing arrangements did not require companies leasing generating 
facilities to upgrade or even maintain those facilities. Certainly, the 
market provided no incentive to do so (Beechey, 2001: 16; Kelton & 
Wheatley, 2001b: 23).  
As with the infamous example of California, it has become clear that 
NEM provides no incentive for generators to invest in new capacity 
because undersupply keeps pool prices very high. Having the standby 
plant necessary to ensure system reliability ‘erodes generator profit… 
Generator profit is inversely proportional to the levels of reserve plant 
with no incentive for system reliability’ (Searle, 2001: 24). A rush of 
new companies undercutting each other to get customers has not 
happened. Rather, as in the US and the UK, the industry is consolidating 
amongst existing companies who are seeking to cushion themselves 
against market fluctuations and become big enough to avoid competition 
(Beder, 2003).  
The big users of electricity in Australia — aluminium, cement, paper and 
glass — were the consumers that gained most from the ‘reform’ process 
during the 1990s before NEM prices began to escalate (Mitchell, 2002: 
54). Additionally, aluminium smelters, which consume 16% of all 
Australian electricity,  have been exempted from having to buy their 
electricity from NEM. Because of their strong lobbying, rather than face 
the vagaries of the market, they have been guaranteed fixed prices for 
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their electricity, which, in effect, are subsidised by other ratepayers 
(AAP, 2002: 17). Thus the process of electricity privatisation has 
exposed individual consumers to a new electricity market which has 
entailed increased costs and reductions in reliability. At the same time, 
state intervention has facilitated the emergence of new oligopolies in the 
electricity industry, and ensured that major capitalist consumers of 
electricity are cushioned from the fluctuations of this new market. 
Another major consequence of electricity privatisation has been heavy 
job losses. Between the mid 1990s and 2003, nationwide employment in 
the sector fell from 83,000 to 33,000 (Wilson, 2003). Not only has this 
cut costs for capital, it has also eroded union power – a key objective and 
consequence of neo-liberalism. For example, the CFMEU's John 
Maitland notes that electricity privatisation has led to the rise of contract 
labour in the electricity industry which has undermined union power and 
resulted in 'inferior wages and working conditions' (Maitland, 2001). 
Furthermore, those communities built around the electricity industry 
have been particularly hard hit by electricity privatisation. Victoria's 
Latrobe Valley experienced job losses of 16,000 as a result of 
privatisation (Halliday, 2000). Such areas have often been centres of 
strong union presence and identification. As neo-liberalism restructures 
the economic and social geography of such areas, so does it threaten 
those features that have been central to union strength. Concurrent with 
these job losses was the implementation by the Kennett government of 
punitive anti-union legislation, which restricted the rights of workers to 
organise collectively (Teicher & Van Gramberg, 1999: 163-7). Rather 
than an example of ‘free labour markets’ the Kennett reforms relied upon 
the coercive powers of the state to enforce freedoms for capital. 
Conclusion 
Electricity privatisation and deregulation in Australia have been 
encouraged, facilitated and implemented by governments and state 
agencies. The costs of the ‘reforms’ have been borne by the electricity 
sector workforce, which has been decimated, and by the rural and 
residential consumers, who have borne the brunt of the resultant 
electricity prices rises. An essential public service has been transferred to 
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private control in two states, and other states have electricity prices 
determined by an electricity market that is subject to price manipulation 
by profit-oriented electricity suppliers. Regulatory structures set up to 
ensure the smooth running of the market have failed to prevent this price 
manipulation or ensure reliability of supply. The winners have been those 
corporations able to buy up the former state-owned industries and impose 
higher prices on consumers.  
Electricity privatisation has thus entailed an interventionist state, 
instituting new forms of governance and working aggressively to secure 
freedoms for capital. Contrary to the pronouncements of neo-liberals 
themselves, neo-liberalism has not heralded a ‘withering away of the 
state’. Rather it has resulted in what Andrew Gamble termed ‘the free 
economy and the strong state’ (Gamble, 1994). Neo-liberalism does not 
deliver the benefits promised by its adherents precisely because of its 
class nature.   
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